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Introduction
The integration of environmental objectives into economic policy typically introduces strategic interactions due to the public goods character of the environmental commodities, and due to the fact that environmental regulations are usually expected to affect the competitiveness of the national economy. Ulph (1996) focuses on "eco-dumping" in a setup with both governments and producers acting strategically. Among other things, the paper shows that welfare will be lower when both governments and producers act in this way. Similarly, Batabyal (1998) considers the problem whether an environmental policy in the context of a Cournot game can make a country worse off when the incidence of pollution is local. Moreover, the effects of environmental regulation by alternate instruments are of interest in the case of border-crossing pollution. Ono (1998) extends the standard model of public goods provision by considering consumption externalities arising from economic activities, which pollute the environment. Under certain assumptions in a strategic context income transfers in both directions can improve the global environmental quality. Finally, an additional source of strategic interactions is provided by an internationally operating oligopolistic industry, which reacts on the environmental policy of the government. Within a framework of intra-industry trade and, alternatively, competition on a third-country market, Conrad (1994) investigates optimal environmental taxes and subsidies for duopolistic firms located in two countries. Barrett (1994) , on the other hand, analyses competitiveness for alternative market structures and alternative forms of industry competition. Under certain conditions, governments then have an incentive to impose "weak" environmental standards.
In contrast to the existing literature, our paper then focuses more on the transition from autarky to free trade in terms of the equilibrium structure, for both regional and international environmental problems. Interesting aspects in this context cover questions of a "level playing field", of "harmonization", as a basis for free trade, or of a "race towards the bottom" resulting from lax environmental standards, of "losing one's higher standards" due to international competition, and of an "immiserization" following an expected degradation of the environment in inter-national trade. Bhagwati (1996) considers these problems to be the "genuine" ones in the context of free trade and the environment. In a more theoretical context, these problems are intimately associated with economic efficiency and fairness.
We consider a model with two countries each of which can produce two commodities by employing two factors of production, labor and environment. We assume that the production functions exhibit constant returns to scale with respect to labor input. A higher level of the environmental standard adopted in a country will decrease the output levels associated with a given labor input. We also assume that in each country there is a representative consumer, whose utility is given by a homothetic utility function. We examine two cases of environmental interdependence between the two countries. One is the class of international environmental problems, where environmental conditions in each country are affected by environmental standards chosen by the other country. Another is regional environmental problems, where none of the countries is affected by the other country's environmental problems. In contrast to international environmental problems, regional environmental problems do not directly affect production and utility in the other country.
The choice of an appropriate environmental standard is the task of governmental agencies, who, at the first stage of the game, propose the environmental standards in accordance with the welfare of the consumers while taking into account the respective action of the other country. In the second stage, the two commodities are produced and exchanged in each country according to the rules of a market economy. Our goal is to examine a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, that results from the interaction of governmental agencies in the two countries.
We show, in particular, that in equilibrium welfare of both countries may decrease when switching from autarky to free trade. Interestingly, this may occur not because of insufficient environmental protection, as is usually argued by environmentally active groups, but because of too much concern for the environment.
"Immiserization" can happen, but for reasons different than usually expected.
We also address the issue whether regulating interference with supply and demand can have a positive effect on welfare. In particular, is it possible to stimulate the protection of the environment by unilateral measures such as taxes or subsidies, quota or tariffs, lump-sum payments or transfers. What will happen to welfare in the country enacting a particular measure? What will happen to welfare in the country affected by this measure? We show that, somewhat counter intuitively, the introduction of a tariff does not affect equilibrium values of the environmental standards, although the change in international prices due to the tariff will have a positive effect on the welfare of the country imposing the tariff. In contrast, the transfer of some units of one of the consumption commodities will increase welfare in both countries, and we will also observe a raise of the levels of environmental standards.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section contains the basic assumptions of the model. In Section 3 we examine an autarky variant of the model. In Section 4 we turn to analysis of free trade. In Section 5 we compare the autarky and free trade equilibria. Section 6 investigates effects of regulatory interference. Some final remarks conclude the paper.
The Model
There are two countries i, j = 1, 2, each of which can produce two commodities by employing two factors of production, labor and environment. The production functions f ij in country i, exhibit constant returns to scale with respect to commodity j:
where e i , 0 ≤ e i ≤ 1, denotes the level of the environmental standard adopted in country i. We do not introduce here specific features of this standard, but one could think, for example, of e i as an abatement level of hazardous waste adopted in country i. The quantity Z i denotes the total labor endowment in country i = 1, 2. To simplify the matters, we assume that country 1 possesses a comparative advantage in the production of commodity 1, i.e.,
Comparative cost advantages resulting from differences in technologies, factor endowments and market demand generate gains from free trade, and we do not consider economies of scale or imperfect competition as alternative sources of gains from trade. Consumers in each country are characterized by an identical homothetic utility function. That is, there is a representative consumer in country i whose utility is given by:
with α ij > 0 and α i1 + α i2 = 1 for i, j = 1, 2. The parameter α ij denotes the share of total income of consumer i spent on commodity j, whereas α i3 is the "propensity" of consumer i towards the protection of the environment, and E i is the state of environment in country i. To specify the way E i is evaluated, we consider two cases of environmental interdependence between the two countries. One is the class of international environmental problems, where environmental conditions in each country are affected by environmental standards chosen by the other country. In this case, the value of E i is assumed to correspond to a weighted sum of the two environmental standards e 1 and e 2 . That is, E i = γ i e i + (1 − γ i )e j , j = i, where γ i with 0 ≤ γ i ≤ 1 is an "impact factor" determined by climatic or other non-economic circumstances. It specifies the effect of country i's own environmental standard on its environmental conditions. Although it would affect most of our result we assume that both coefficients, γ 1 and γ 2 are not smaller than 0.5. In other words, an impact of its own standard on the state of environment in country i would be at least as strong as the standard chosen by the other country.
In the case of regional environmental problems, where none of the countries is affected by the other country's environmental problems and the choice of an environmental standard, E i is simply equal to e i , the value of the environmental standard adopted by country i. Obviously, by setting γ 1 = γ 2 = 1, we may consider the case of regional environmental problems as a special case of international environmental problems. It is, however, of interest to examine the case of regional environmental 6 effects separately. To distinguish between these two cases, we assume that in the case of international environmental problems, the coefficients γ 1 and γ 2 are strictly less than one, i.e., a choice of environmental standards in country j has a nonnegligible impact on the state of environment in country i = j. The two commodities are produced and exchanged in each country according to the rules and regulations of a market economy. The choice of an appropriate environmental standard is, however, the task of governmental agencies. They propose the environmental standards in accordance with the welfare of the consumers while taking into account the respective action of the other country. Formally, we examine a two-stage model. In the first stage the governmental agencies choose their own environmental standards and in the second, firms and households make their production and consumption decisions by selecting equilibrium allocations in the goods and factor markets, given the choice of environmental standards in the first stage. Then we investigate a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game which is a natural concept to examine the outcome of the interaction of the governmental agencies in the two countries. Our assumptions guarantee that, given any pair of equilibrium standards chosen in the first stage, the choices of both countries in the second stage are uniquely determined. Thus, by substituting the outcome of the second stage into countries' utilities, we may reduce our game to a one-stage game of environmental standards and to focus on its Nash equilibria.
In this paper we distinguish between autarky, where the countries are not engaged in commodity trade, and free trade. It gives rise to four different situations, which will be studied in the following sections:
• autarky with regional environmental problems,
• autarky with international environmental problems,
• free trade with regional environmental problems,
• free trade with international environmental problems.
Autarky Equilibrium
Consider first the autarky case in which there is no commodity trade between the two countries. Let (e 1 , e 2 ), a pair of environmental standards, chosen in the first stage of the game, be given. Our assumptions guarantee that in the second stage there is a unique equilibrium allocation (
,2 for which there exists a price system (w
) is a profit-maximizing factor allocation in country i,
Our specification of utilities yields:
By using these equilibrium allocations, we consider the indirect utilities of each country which depend only on the choices of e 1 and e 2 .Thus, we reduce our game to the choice of environmental standards only.
In the case of international environmental problems we denote the indirect utilities by
By using the utility specification (1) and the expressions for equilibrium allocations, we obtain:
For regional environmental problems we introduce the utility levels
and, similarly to the case of international environmental problems, we have an explicit expression:
It is important to mention that the choice of an environmental standard e i has an ambiguous effect on the utility of the consumers. On the one hand, there is a positive effect of a cleaner environment, whereas, on the other hand, there is a negative effect resulting from lower production and consumption levels. Moreover, in the case of international environmental effects the actions of the foreign government will affect the home country directly. We consider, therefore, a strategic interaction for the governmental agencies of the two countries, which is captured in the following definitions of an autarky equilibrium. It is simply a Nash equilibrium under autarky regime where strategic variables are represented by choices of environmental standards.
Definition 3.1 The pair of environmental standards (e
2 ) is an autarky equilibrium with respect to international environmental problems if the inequality v
holds for every level of environmental standard e i , 0 ≤ e i ≤ 1.
Definition 3.2 The pair of environmental standards (e
2 ) is an autarky equilibrium with respect to regional environmental problems if the inequality v
Autarky with International Environmental Problems
Our first result demonstrates the role of the propensities towards the protection of the environment, α 13 and α 23 , and the impact factors γ 1 and γ 2 . The country with a higher "adjusted" propensity towards the protection of the environment will adopt a higher environmental standard: 
Then we obtain the following (interior) equilibrium values of the environmental standards:
It remains to observe that the only different terms in (6) and (7) An inspection of the above reaction curves reveals that both higher values of the impact factor γ i and the coefficient α i3 will shift these curves outward and thus induce more concern for the protection of the environment. Now let us turn to the issue of efficiency of the equilibrium. Our next result shows that, in general, the equilibrium levels of environmental standards in international setting are not efficient (see Figure 1) . A unilateral increase in the environmental standard in country 1 raises welfare of country 2 and a unilateral increase in the environmental standard in country 2 raises welfare of country 1. Then the convexity of the indifference curves yields the existence of the values e 1 and e 2 with e i > e I,A i
2 ) for i = 1, 2. In this sense there is "too little" concern about the environment.
Several international agreements to protect the environment, e.g. the Kyoto Protocol, require a uniform percentage reduction of emission levels of some hazardous waste. In our framework this would correspond to a uniform percentage increase of the values of the environmental standards. It turns out that "small" uniform percentage increases in the environmental standards may, indeed, improve welfare in both countries: Proof: Expressions (2)-(3) imply that the welfare of country i is positively correlated with the level of environmental standards in country j = i. Thus the welfare improvement in both countries with respect to the Nash equilibrium is possible only if both countries raise their levels of standards.
Consider now the pair of equilibrium environmental standards (e
2 ). Recall that the first order conditions for country 1 yield 
Autarky with Regional Environmental Problems
In this case the value of the parameters γ 1 and γ 2 is equal to one and the countries are not affected by the choices of the environmental standards of their neighbors.
Note that expressions (4)-(5) allow us to derive the following (interior) equilibrium values for the environmental standards:
The following corollary of Result 3.1.1 again demonstrates the role of the propensities towards the protection of the environment, α 13 and α 23 : the country with the higher propensity towards the protection of the environment will adopt the higher environmental standard: In this context there is no need to consider a harmonization of the equilibrium environmental standards. However, due to strategic interactions, the situation will change when we allow for free trade examined in the next section.
Free Trade Equilibrium
In the case of free trade, the environmental decisions of the governments will also be affected by the amount of commodities available for import or export.
Our assumptions guarantee that for every pair of environmental standards (e 1 , e 2 ), there is a unique second-stage allocation (x T ij (e 1 , e 2 ), z T ij (e 1 , e 2 )) j=1,2 with a price system (w e 2 ) ) is a profit-maximizing factor allocation in country i,
• the consumption bundle (x T i1 (e 1 , e 2 ), x T i2 (e 1 , e 2 )) maximizes country i's utility given the budget w T i (e 1 , e 2 ) · Z i .
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Similar to the case of autarky, our specification of utilities implies that x T 11 (e 1 , e 2 ) = α 11 β 11 (1 − e 1 )Z 1 , x T 12 (e 1 , e 2 ) = α 21 β 22 (1 − e 2 )Z 2 , x T 21 (e 1 , e 2 ) = α 12 β 11 (1 − e 1 )Z 1 , x T 22 (e 1 , e 2 ) = α 22 β 22 (1 − e 2 )Z 2 .
Observe, however, that due to international trade x T 1j (e 1 , e 2 ) and x T 2j (e 1 , e 2 ) add up to β jj (1 − e j )Z j , the total amount of commodity j, to be produced in country j with complete specialization resulting from free trade.
Let i, j = 1, 2 with i = j. In the case of international environmental problems
By using (1) and the expressions for equilibrium allocations, we can derive the utility levels in both countries for any pair of environmental standards (e 1 , e 2 ):
Similarly, in the case of regional environmental problems denote the indirect
Again, using the specification of utilities and the expressions for equilibrium allocations, for a given pair of environmental standards (e 1 , e 2 ), we obtain the following expressions for indirect utilities:
The ambiguous effect of choosing environmental standards is amplified by free trade. It is important to examine whether lax environmental standards will lead to a "race towards the bottom" and therefore to a possibly lower welfare or "immiserization". The governmental agencies of the two countries face the strategic dilemma, which is captured by the following definitions of free trade equilibria. 
Free Trade with International Environmental Problems
We assume again that country i = 1, 2 specializes completely in the production of commodity i when switching from autarky to free trade.
In determining the environmental standards, note that, as in the case of autarky, the propensity towards the protection of the environment still plays an important role in determining the equilibrium levels of the environmental standards. However, the governments are less willing to adopt higher standards with an increasing share of the consumers' expenditures on the "home" product. This problem does not arise in the case of autarky, characterized by incomplete specialization in the production of both commodities. Under free trade, it seems more important to protect consumers from a too extensive reduction in the production of the commodity due to a high environmental standard. Our result states that the country with a higher ratio of the propensity towards protection of environment and the share of income devoted to its "home" product will adopt a higher environmental standard: Proof: By using (10)- (11) 
It remains to observe that the only difference between (14) and (15) 
> e I,T
2 , although α 13 < α 23 . In this sense, the issue of an "unfair trade" because of different propensities towards the protection of the environment becomes blurred.
Let us now turn to the issue of efficiency (or rather inefficiency) of the Nash equilibrium in our framework. The inspection of the indirect utility functions reveals that an increase in the environmental standard e j will either increase or decrease utility v I,T i , i = j. The exact direction of change depends, however, on the values of the parameters, as e j affects v I,T i in both a positive and a negative way. Hence, in equilibrium there could be too much or too little concern about the environment.
There could even be the case that there is too much concern in one country and too little in the other one. • there is too much concern about the environment if α 11 < 0.5,
• there is too little concern about the environment if α 11 > 0.5,
• the Nash equilibrium is efficient if α 11 = 0.5.
Proof:
Consider first a symmetric case. By maximizing the (identical) utilities of two countries in the case where e 1 = e 2 , we conclude that the utilities of both countries are maximized when e 1 = e 2 = α 13 /(1 + α 13 ). However, by (14)- (15), the equilibrium standards are given by e I,T 1 = e I,T 2 = α 13 /(2α 11 + α 13 ). Thus,
• there is too much concern about the environment if 2α 11 < 1,
• there is too little concern about the environment if 2α 11 > 1,
• the Nash equilibrium is efficient if 2α 11 = 1.
¾
It is quite easy to demonstrate the inefficiency of a Nash equilibrium, as we have done in the autarky case, by simultaneously changing environmental standards in both countries in the same direction, i.e., either by increasing or decreasing those levels. It is worth to point out that it is possible to improve the welfare of both countries, by increasing the standard in one country and decreasing it in another country. will raise utilities in both countries (see Figure 3) .
Harmonization in the sense of identical values of the environmental standards or in the sense of a uniform percentage adjustment of these values will therefore be sustainable only in exceptional situations. In view of the above observations, one of these exceptional cases is provided by countries with identical or almost identical consumers.
Free Trade with Regional Environmental Problems
The (interior) values of the environmental standards associated with free trade equilibrium are given by:
As in the case of international environmental problems, the propensity towards the protection of the environment plays an important role in determining the equilibrium levels of the environmental standards, and governments are less willing to adopt higher standards with an increasing share of the consumers' expenditures on the "home" product: for i = j. The convexity of the indifference curves then implies that there exist values (e 1 , e 2 ) with e i < e R,T i
2 ) for i = 1, 2. Thus, there is "too much" concern about the environment. These conclusions are summarized in the following result: 
Suppose now that both countries jointly change their environmental levels by the same percentage t > 0. Let us now examine the change in countries' utilities. We
(18) implies that the last expression is negative. Thus, both countries could be made better off by a uniform percentage decrease of their environmental standards.¾
As an immediate consequence, in the symmetric case α 11 = α 22 , α 12 = α 21 , α 13 = α 23 both countries are better off by choosing a lower standard e 1 = e 2 = α 13 /(1 + α 13 ) rather than e R,T 1 = e R,T 2 = α 13 /(α 11 + α 13 ).
Given the result on the inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium, harmonized environmental standards can only be lower than the equilibrium values. This is, at first glance, a surprising result, closely related to the nature of the inefficiency. More exactly, a sufficiently small uniform percentage reduction of the values of the environmental standards will increase utilities of both countries in the framework considered here. Thus, a downward "harmonization" is sustainable in our framework.
However, "harmonized" equilibrium values in the sense of imposing identical environmental standards improving the situation of both countries exist only for countries, which are not too far apart in terms of the equilibrium levels of the environmental standards in free trade. The multiplicity of those harmonized standards poses another problem with respect to equilibrium selection (see Figure 4) .
The next section contains a comparison of the autarky regime with free trade.
Comparison of Autarky with Free Trade

International Environmental Problems
The issues considered in this section are related to the possibility of a race towards the bottom and the immiserization in terms of an increasing degradation of the environment under free trade.
First we observe that even in the case of "symmetrical" environmental effects, one of the countries would decrease its environmental standard. However, it would not simultaneously happen for both countries: 
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Similarly, a simple inspection of (7) and (15) The proof of this result is presented in the Appendix.
However, if the symmetry of environmental effects is abandoned then it is possible that the state of environment in one country may decline. again, it cannot happen in both countries.
Result 5.1.3 It is possible that the inequality E
A i > E T i is satisfied for country i.
However, if it is indeed the case then E
The proof of this result is relegated to appendix as well.
The final result of this subsection demonstrates that equilibrium utility levels in free trade problems may be below equilibrium utility levels in autarky when international problems are concerned. The reason for this "immiserization" is, however, not a degradation of the environment. To the contrary, immiserization arises from too much concern about the environment accompanied by an undue decrease of the production levels of the two commodities. 
Regional Environmental Problems
The first result shows that for the case of regional environmental problems a race towards the bottom in terms of an increasing degradation of the environment under free trade will not happen. The reason is the increase in world output, which is associated with free trade in comparison to autarky. Thus, there is "more room" for higher values of the environmental standards, and none of the countries must be concerned about losing "her higher standards". Proof: Follows from (8)- (9) and (16)-(17).¾ Similar to the case of international environmental problems, by comparing the equilibrium levels of the environmental standards it is obvious that free trade levels may be different although the propensities towards the protection of the environment are identical across the countries. Thus, the issue of "unfair trade" cannot be justified alone on the basis of differing environmental standards in equilibrium.
The next result demonstrates that also in the case of regional environmental problems equilibrium utility levels in free trade may be below equilibrium utility levels in autarky. Again, the reason is not a worse state of the environment, but too much concern about the environment accompanied by an unwarranted decrease of the production levels of the two commodities. )β 21 Z 2 + α 23 ∆.
As an immediate consequence, welfare in country 2 will always increase given the above condition, whereas welfare in country 1 may decrease for larger values of ∆.
Final Remarks
In this paper we investigated some of Bhagwati's genuine problems, interfering with free trade and the environment. In a model based on comparative advantage we demonstrated that environmental standards can be different in free trade equilibrium although the propensities towards the protection of the environment are identical. Thus, the issue of "unfair trade" is problematic at least as long as it is based on differing environmental standards alone. With respect to the problem of "losing one's higher standards" our results are ambiguous, at least for the case of international environmental problems. "Immiserization" can happen, both for the case of regional and international environmental problems. The reason is, however, a too strong emphasis on the environmental issues, and not an increasing degradation of the environment in equilibrium.
Some results on the possibilities of affecting the other country's environmental policy by regular instruments of the trade policy demonstrate that only the transfer of units of a consumption commodity may have the required effect. These results depend, however, substantially on the structure of the model.
Appendix
In order to prove Results 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 we will use the following lemma:
Lemma: (i) The inequality E Both assertions follow from (6)- (7) and (14)- (15) by evaluating the differences E 
